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Abstract
Most of the empirical literature on the relative merits of alternative exchange rate
regimes uses the IMF de jure classification based on the regime that governments claim
to have, abstracting from the fact that many countries that in theory follow flexible
regimes intervene in the exchange market to an extent that in practice makes them
indistinguishable from fixed rate regimes, and vice versa. To address this problem, in
this paper we construct a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes. Using cluster
analysis techniques, we group different regimes according to their behavior along three
classification dimensions: the nominal exchange rate, changes in the nominal exchange
rate, and international reserves. We compare our results with the IMF classification, and
discuss the main discrepancies. The paper provides an exchange rate classification for
each country and each year during the period 1990-1998 which is readily available for
downloading at http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen or http://www.utdt.edu/~ely.
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21. Motivation
The proper assessment of costs and benefits of alternative exchange rate regimes has
been a hotly debated issue. Most of the literature has concentrated either in the tradeoff
between monetary independence and credibility implied by different exchange rate
regimes, or on the insulation properties of each arrangement in the face of monetary and
real shocks. However, recent episodes of financial distress have led to renewed interest
on the topic, by introducing the question of which exchange rate regime is better suited
to deal with increasingly global and unstable world capital markets. Recent
contributions on the issue include Eichengreen (1994), Calvo (1999), Frankel (1999),
Rose (1999) and Larraín and Velasco (1999).
In this paper, we argue that most of the research in this area has been misguided. Not in
the questions that it has asked, which are important and relevant, but in the way the
literature has, so far, classified exchange rate regimes. It has been common practice in
this literature to classify exchange rate regimes by the de jure (l gal) regime as
compiled by the IMF, i.e., according to the regime the country declares to be running.2
In turn, this classification has been the standard regime index used in econometric work.
We believe that this procedure is misleading. There are countries that in theory have a
flexible rate but for whom intervention in exchange markets is so pervasive that in
practice very little difference exists (in terms of either policy or observable outcomes)
with countries that have explicit fixed exchange rate regimes. Conversely, inflation
prone countries usually have unsustainable fixed exchange rates. Periodic devaluations
are therefore the result of the implementation of monetary policies that are inconsistent
with fixing the exchange rate and that make the effective regime more similar to a
flexible arrangement. Moreover, countries that appear to behave according to the
declared regime during tranquil times may be tempted to change their course of action
once the regime is under stress.
All this implies that, for the purpose of studying the impact of different exchange rate
regimes, a new classification is required to capture the true differences in actual policies
that are not properly taken into account by the legal definition. Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and
Wolf (1997) pursue this idea when they examine the impact of exchange rate regimes
on fiscal performance, inflation and real variables, going beyond a simple de jure
classification of exchange rate regimes.3 Fri den et al. (1998) also modify the standard
IFS classification in order to account for frequent adjusters and for different types of
crawls.
While similar in spirit to our research, this work does not account for different degrees
of intervention under flexible regimes and, more importantly, they stop short of
constructing a usable classification index. Similarly, this work underscores that there is
no agreement even on the number of exchange rate regimes that should be considered.
                                   
2 See any issue of the IMF’s Exchang Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. An example of the IMF
de jure classification can be found in any issue of the International Financial Statistics.
3 For example, they do not consider as “fixers” those countries which experienced substantial devaluation
of their exchange rate.
3As will be seen below our methodology allows to use the data to make a statement on
the number of regimes which can be distinguished from the data.
In this paper, we intend to cover this needed methodological step, proposing one such
index to be used in future research. More precisely, we group different exchange rate
regimes according to the behavior of three classification variables: the nominal
exchange rate, the change of the nominal exchange rate, and international reserves.
Underlying the selection of this variables is the idea that a textbook definition of
exchange rate regimes would associate fixed exchange rate regimes with high volatility
in international reserves coupled with little volatility in the nominal exchange rate. On
the contrary, flexible regimes would exhibit substantial volatility in nominal rates with
relatively little volatility in reserves. Thus, the different behavior in each of these
variables should be sufficient to determine the regime to which each country
corresponds.
In order to make such classification we use a cluster analysis methodology which so ts
the cases into a given number of groups according to the characteristics for the three
variables of reference. We apply the classification procedure twice. As in the first
round, the algorithm groups a substantial number of countries in a cluster characterized
by a small variability along all dimensions, we repeat the classification procedure only
for countries belonging to this low variability cluster, to acknowledge the existence of
distinct regimes within this group. We think that the distinction between high and low
variability countries could be potentially very useful. By introducing this variability
dimension, this new methodology has the advantage that it allows to incorporate to the
econometric analysis the intensity of shocks to which the regime is subject,
something that qualitative indexes previously used did not allow for. This may turn out
to be relevant for the empirical analysis as a way of testing whether the policy response
under different exchange rate regimes, and their impact on other variables, depends on
the relative magnitude of underlying shocks. As is discussed below, the intensity
dimension is also important to avoid the usual bias towards the irrelevance hypothesis,
particularly likely if the effect of the regime on other variables is significant only at high
volatility levels.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data, the construction of the
variables, and the exchange rate classification procedure. Section 3 provides the
classification results and compares them with the IMF classification. Finally, Section 4
discusses further empirical work and concludes.
2. Methodology
Classification variables
Our classification is based on three variables closely related to exchange rate behavior.
Exchange rate volatility (ME) is measured as the average of the absolute monthly
percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate during the year. Volatility of exchange
rate changes (DE) is measured as the standard deviation of the monthly percentage
changes in the exchange rate. For both of these variables it was necessary to establish a
currency of reference. For this we chose the legal peg currency or, in the case of
managed floats, the currency to which the exchange rate exhibited the least volatility
4from among the major currencies.4 Countries which pegged their currency to a basket
were eliminated from the sample unless the basket weights were known and the central
peg parity could be computed. The reference currency for each country is presented in
Appendix 1.
The third classification variable, vol ility of reserves (MR) is measured as the average
of the absolute monthly change in international reserves relative to the monetary base in
the previous month in order to proxy the monetary impact of these changes. More
precisely, we subtract government deposits at the central bank from the central bank’s
net foreign assets and divide its monthly change by the monetary base lagged one
month.5 External liabilities had to be eliminated in order to consider only international
reserves with a counterpart in monetary aggregates. In turn, changes in government
deposits have to be netted out to correct for variations in international reserves that do
not lead to changes in base money.6
The data computes a yearly figure for each classification variable for all countries that
reported in the IFS. The period of analysis is 1990-1998.7 A summ r  of the database is
presented in Figures 1 through 3, which show the histograms for the three variables.8
The distribution of both exchange rate variables, ME and DE, (resp. Figures 1 and 2),
are highly skewed to the left. In the first case, for example, more than 350 cases out of a
total sample of 955 (each case representing an annual figure for a given country) exhibit
no change in the nominal exchange rate, and the number of cases decreases as the
monthly devaluation increases. As expected, the same pattern is valid for the rate of
change of the nominal exchange rate, with the mode corresponding to fix rate regimes.
Figure 3 shows the variability for international reserves relative to the monetary base.
Here relatively fewer observations correspond to the case of a low monthly change with
the mode indicating an average monthly fluctuation in international reserves of about
5% of the monetary base. The curve still shows substantial skewness indicating that
most countries exhibit a volatility of between 0 and 5% in its international reserves.
Exchange Rate Regimes
According to the three classification variables described above, a priori we expect
different regimes to exhibit the following patterns:
                                   
4 The US dollar, the French franc, the German marc, the British pound, and the Japanese yen were
considered. All data are from the IFS.
5 We use line 11 from the IFS, net of lines 16c and 16d, and divide its change by line 14 (or 14a if line 14
was not available) lagged one month.
6 Oil producing countries and countries with important privatization programs are examples of cases
where the latter correction matters.
7 The complete database is available at http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen or http://www.utdt.edu/~ely.




Flexible High High Low
Dirty FloatMedium Medium Medium
Crawling PegMedium/HighLow Medium/High
Fixed Low Low High
The interpretation of Table 1 is straightforward. According to the textbook definition
flexible exchange rates are characterized by little intervention in the exchange rate
markets together with high volatility of exchange rates. Conversely, a fixed exchange
rate regime occurs when the exchange rate does not move (or moves very little) while
reserves fluctuate substantially. A crawling peg system corresponds to the case when
changes in the nominal exchange rate are significant, but with relatively stable
increments, accompanied by active intervention in exchange rate markets. A dirty float
corresponds to the case in which volatility is relatively high across all variables, with
exchange rates moving in spite of active intervention.9
Finally, countries that do not display significant variability in either variable are
grouped in a class that we denote “inconclusive”. The wording is not arbitrary since,
given the magnitude of the changes involved, the experience of these countries should
not tell us much about the specific impact of the type of regime on the behavior of the
economy. The underlying hypothesis is that the exchange rate regime has an impact on
economic performance only when the variables that distinguish the different regimes
show discernible different patterns. If so, the inclusion of “inconclusive” cases on the
right hand side of standard econometric tests would bias the results in favor of the
hypothesis that exchange rate regimes have no significant bearing on other variables. 10
Cluster analysis
Once the three classification measures are computed for our universe of countries, we
use cluster analysis as a way of assigning countries to different groups. We consider
each cluster as representing a distinct exchange rate regime, independently of the
“legal” regime stated by the country that is assigned to this group.
                                   
9 Frankel (1999) identifies nine exchange rate regimes: currency union, currency board, “truly fixed”
exchange rates, adjustable peg, crawling peg, basket peg, target zone or band , managed float and free
float. These nine groups can be broadly mapped into the four categories identified in our work, with the
first three groups corresponding to a fix, the next three to a crawling peg, and the last two to a dirty and a
pure float. Exchange rate bands may behave either as a crawling peg (when the exchange rate hits one of
the bounds), as a float (when it fluctuates within the band) or as a dirty float (in the presence of
intramarginal intervention). At any rate, it is interesting to stress that an increase in the number of clusters
in our specification did not lead to the appearance of a new and clearly identifiable group, suggesting that,
from the point of view of the observed behavior of the data, there is no much information to be gained by
going beyond our four-way classification.
10 Unlike the case of traditional exchange rate regime indexes, our classification allows us to test this
hypothesis empirically.
6Cluster analysis is a technique used to identify homogeneous groups or clusters.11 Wh le
the standard discriminant analysis starts from a known classification of the sample to
derive a classification rule to be applied to out-of-sample cases, cluster analysis has the
advantage that it does not need to know in advance the type of regime we are facing but
rather works in the opposite direction, constructing groups according to similarities
(distances) between the sample elements measured over (in our case) the three
dimensional space defined by the classification variables previously described.
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HC), typically used for small samples, allows for a
discretionality on the part of the researcher in determining the way distances are
measured, in the order the sample is introduced and in how the classification itself is
realized. In general, methods for defining clusters fall into three groups: linkage
methods, error sums of squares, or variance methods. All of them start from a matrix of
distances between pairs of elements, and differ in how they estimate distances between
clusters at successive steps. Thus, in the nearest neighbor method (single linkage) the
first two cases combined are those with the smallest distance between them. The
distance between the new cluster and other individual cases is then computed as the
minimum distance between an individual case and a case in the cluster. At every step,
the distance between two clusters is taken to be the distance between their two closest
points. We can describe along similar lines other variants like the complete linkage
(furthest neighbor), the average linkage, or the centroid methods.
Alternatively, in K-Means Cluster Analysis (KMC), based on nearest centroid sorting
(Andergerg, 1973), a case is assigned to the cluster with the smallest distance between
the case and the center of the cluster (centroid). The number of clusters is specified ex-
ante by the user, and cluster centers are iteratively estimated from the data. This method
requires the least intervention from the researcher. Since it is crucial to our work that the
resulting classification should be as candid as possible, with minimum manipulation of
the classification criteria, we choose KMC as our classification method.12
However, because KMC relies on a measure of the distance between points it is
important that measures be comparable in order to obtain a relevant classification along
all dimensions. In order to achieve this we z-normalize all variables by using deviations
to the mean divided by the standard deviation. Prior to this normalization we eliminate
the 1 percent-upper tail of observations for each of the three dimensions, which entailed
leaving 22 observations out from a sample. 13
                                   
11 The most common examples of the use of this technique come from the areas in which it is most
frequently used: numerical taxonomy of animals and plants (biology), distinct pathological groups
(medicine), people with similar buying habits (marketing), etc.
12 We use SPSS 8.0 as our computational device. The algorithm for the K-means classification proceeds
as follows: “The first k cases in the data file, where k is the number of clusters requested, are selected as
temporary centers. As subsequent cases are processed, a case replaces a center if the smallest distance to a
center is greater than the distance between the two closest centers. The center that is closer to the case is
replaced. A case also replaces a center if the smallest distance from the case to a center is larger than the
smallest distance between the center and all other centers. Again, it replaces the center closest to it”
(Norusis, 1993).
13 Because these outli rs do not present classification problems, we re-classify these observations ex-post.
The procedure for their classification was to classify them around the centroids obtained fro the
classification of all the remaining data. In short, this procedure is equivalent to assigning these
observations to the cluster with the nearest centroid. In the tables, countries classified according to this
criterion are denoted by the indicator (3).
73. Exchange Rate Regime Classification
In order to provide the starkest version of our analysis we proceed in the following
fashion. After eliminating all yearly observations for which one of the variables was
unavailable, and after eliminating outliers and normalizing we use the K-means
procedure to classify countries into the 5 clusters described in Table 1. We call this first
pass at the data the 1st round classification.
In general this initial classification allocates a high proportion of countries within the
“inconclusive” category. As discussed in the introduction, identifying separately these
countries should be useful information for empirical work, as it singles out those
countries where shocks did not require significant adjustments in either the nominal
exchange rate or reserves.
However, this group contains countries with very well defined exchange rate regimes.
While variations may be small, countries within this group can exhibit no change in the
nominal exchange rate, with active (albeit small) change in international reserves,
corresponding to the fixed rate group. Similarly, countries may show no volatility in
international reserves and small but positive volatility in the nominal exchange rate.
These countries should be classified as floats.
In order to recover this potentially useful information, while distinguishing at the same
time high and low variability cases, we reclassify the “inconclusive” cases using the
same methodology as before. That is, we re-normalize the data for these cases, and
apply the K-means procedure on the normalized values, again allowing for five groups.
We call this analysis of the “inconclusive” sub-group the 2nd round classification. In
general the two-round procedure assigns an exchange rate regime to most countries in
the sample, i.e. the “inconclusive” from the 2nd round classification are relatively few.14
The classification methodology is summarized in Figure 4 and the main results of the
classification are presented in Tables 2 through 4. Appendix 2 shows the classification
results for each country and year, to be used as input in empirical work.15 Table 2 shows
the upper and lower bounds of the three underlying variables for the 1st and 2nd round
classifications, and confirm that the identified groups span the data as expected.
For the 1st round classification several interesting results are evident from the numbers.
First, fixed and floating exchange rate regimes clearly diverge in the behavior of
international reserves. Whereas floating rates exhibit changes in reserves that oscillate
between 0.1% and 13% on average, the equivalent range for fixed rates goes from
12.4% to 41.8%. While there are some dirties which exhibit low intervention in foreign
exchange markets, these cases are in general associated with much larger fluctuations in
the nominal exchange rate. The evidence seems to make the following important point:
Pure floats appear to tolerate relatively minor fluctuations in the exchange rate. As a
rule, countries with substantial movements in the nominal exchange rate usually
intervene actively in exchange rate markets.
                                   
14 In the tables, the countries that are classified in this second round are denoted by the indicator (2), to
keep track of low variability countries within each category.
15 This table is also available for downloading in Excel format for direct use in
http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen.
8Regarding the variability in the nominal exchange rate, the group of countries
considered to have a pure float includes average monthly devaluation rates which range
between 1.1% and 4.9% whereas countries classified in the fixed exchange rate regime
includes pure fixes as well as cases with changes in the nominal exchange rate that go as
far as 4.5%.
In the 2nd round classification the grouping becomes more dichotomous between the
fixers and the floats. While fixers exhibit a volatility of the nominal exchange rate that
goes from zero to 0.3%, floaters exhibit a volatility that ranges between 0.5% and 1.4%.
On the reserves dimension, floaters have an intervention rate between 0.1% and 5.4% of
base money, whereas for fixers the minimum average intervention is 5.7%. Within the
2nd round classification there is no clear distinction between the two types of
intermediate regimes (managed floats).
The relative frequency of each regime is presented in Table 3. The table shows that,
based on the final, two-round, classification, cases are evenly distributed between
floaters and fixers, with an equivalent number of cases in the managed floating group.
This result arises from a larger participation of floaters in the 1st round classificati n and
a larger number of fixers among the 2nd round classification. As the latter cases
correspond to countries which are not subject to substantial volatility in international
capital markets this result could be indicating that as volatility increases most countries
(are forced to) edge towards floating their exchange rates. Conversely, inverting the
direction of causality, this finding may interpreted as suggesting that fix exchange rate
regimes are more often associated with greater stability.16
The fact that cluster centroids are determined from observations spanning nine years of
data implicitly fixes the regime characteristic (coordinates) over the period, and use
them as a time-invariant benchmark against which to compare observations belonging
to particular years. Thus, one should expect different international market conditions to
affect the relative frequency of regimes over the years. Thus, while we find relatively
few manage floats during the tranquil early years (1990-1993), the degree of
intervention jumps dramatically in 1994 and 1995.
A substantial body of literature has discussed whether in the context of increasing
capital mobility the sustainability of managed exchange rate regimes was becoming
more and more difficult. This point, stressed by Eichengreen (1994), and referred to as
the “hollowing out hypothesis”, has also been addressed by Frankel (1999) and Cohen
(1999). Table 4a and 4b gives us some indication as to whether the hollowing out
hypothesis holds true in our sample: As can be seen from the tables there is no
indication of a gradual disappearance of intermediate regimes. Even though the
methodology allows for a change in the number of cases belonging to each group every
year, we find no apparent pattern supporting the “hollowing out hypothesis” in the data.
A comparison with the IFS classification
                                   
16 The discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this paper and certainly deserves a careful
econometric analysis.
9Tables A3.1 through A3.9 presented in the Appendix 3 compare our classification with
the standard de ju e classification used by the IMF.17 As expected, there is a high degree
of coincidence between both classifications, but also a substantial number of
mismatches.
Table 5 provides a first pass at the nature of the discrepancies. Excluding 2nd ound
inconclusives, which are not assigned to any particular regime, we compute the count
the number of countries which claim to be fixers but which show substantial movement
in their exchange rates, and those countries which claim to be floaters but which
actively intervene in exchange rate markets.18 The number of countries which seem not
to follow their word seems to have declined from about 30% at the beginning of the
sample to about 20% towards the end. While there seems to be an increased consistency
between what is said and what is done, the pattern is by no means monotonic
throughout the sample period.
Looking more carefully at the tables presented in the Appendix, one can clearly identify
the sources of discrepancies. Fixers which do not fix correspond to countries with
occasional devaluations including the CFA countries in 1994 and  Spain afte  1992.
Venezuela and Nepal also appear occasionally in this category.
Conversely, many countries that claimed to run a floating rate displayed little exchange
rate volatility coupled with intense foreign exchange market intervention, so that in
reality they are closer to a fix exchange rate regime. Brazil and New Zealand appear
occasionally in this group as well as some Scandinavian economies like Norway,
Finland and Sweden.
An informal test of the theory
An additional test for the validity of our classification is to track, for particular
countries, the regime that follows from the new classification. Table 14 shows for
selected countries the result of our classification. As can be seen from the Table, the
developed economies within the first group have consistently sustained a pure float.
Indeed, the fact that the regime is identified as float in the 1st round indicates that these
countries have allowed for a non-negligible degree of volatility in the exchange rate.
For the emerging economies in this sample the results look different. Here market
intervention is more pervasive. As expected for high inflation countries, the Dirty/CP
classification appears to be the most common. There are exceptions, however:
Argentina maintained a fixed rate since 1992, and both Mexico and Chile allow for pure
floats.
                                   
17 In the tables, inconclusive countries are those classified in this category in the second round. Outliers
are denoted by the indicator (3), and assigned to a group based on their relative distance to the cent ids
of the different clusters obtained from the K-Means procedure as explained in footnote 7. We have also
elmiminated from this table those countries which changed their exchange rate during the year. The table
of countries which changed their IFS classification, together with our classification value for that year are
presented in table A3.10 in Appendix 3.
18 Precisely, what we do to estimate the number of fixers which are not fixed is to add the countries in the
column “fixed” which in our classification correspond to floaters or to any of the two types of dirty floats.
Similarly, to compute the floaters which do not float we add the countries in the column “float” which in
our classification correspond to fixers of dirty floats.
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Western European economies also show different patterns. Whereas towards the end,
exchange rate stability prevailed (with the exception of Italy), in the interim we find
divergent results. Denmark, for example, which has remained out of the EMU, has been
consistently linked to the deutsche marc. Similarly, France has intervened actively to
keep its parity in line with the marc. On the other hand, Italy allowed its currency to
float in the aftermath of the British devaluation of 1992.
For small open economies the common pattern has been to fix their exchange rates to
the currencies of its main partner(s), something to be expected given their rather limited
range for an independent monetary policy.19 However, we also find countries with
relatively little intervention, which are therefore classified in the irrelevant category.
Interest rate policy
An important question related to our facts-based approach is the role played by the
interest rate policy, a dimension that we ignored in our classification procedure.20 It
could be argued that in some cases interest rates, instead of reserves, are used to
equilibrate the exchange rate market, a practice that could potentially defeat the purpose
of this classification by identifying as free floaters countries that actively intervene to
stabilize the exchange rate. Although this represents a legitimate argument, several
reasons move us to leave interest rate out of the classification process.
First, we believe that the scope for interest rate policy to alter exchange market
conditions without a concomitant movement in reserves is quite limited, both in
duration and strength, as indicated by the success of most of the speculative attack
episodes during our sample period.
But even if this were not the case, whether a positive correlation between interest rates
and market pressure should be directly associated with a fix or dirty exchange rate
regime is not obvious. While it is true that countries tend to use interest rate policy to
stabilize the nominal exchange rate, this may be regarded just as an example of the
active use of monetary policy, which is perfectly in line with the textbook definition of
a flexible rate regime. Indeed, it is easy to see that a policy that targets inflation can
induce exactly the same type of behavior, making it extremely difficult to disentangle
whether the interest rate hike is due to “fear of floating”21, or whe her it is counteracting
the inflationary effect of a depreciation.22
Hausmann (1999) provides a useful illustration of the point, by contrasting the evidence
from Australia and Mexico. Australia lowered interest rates at the beginning of the
Asian crisis, easing monetary policy to compensate for the deflationary effects of the
crisis and allowing the local currency to depreciate. Mexico, on the other hand,
tightened monetary conditions in early 1998 when it faced increased exchange rate
pressure. As a result, the correlation between exchange rate and interest rate changes is
positive in the latter and negative in the former.23 However, according to our
                                   
19 It is interesting to note that most of the pegs to currency baskets with undisclosed weights that had to be
excluded from the sample belong to this group.
20 We are grateful to Ricardo Haussman for bringing up this point to us.
21 This is a point made in Calvo (1999).
22 The more so in the case of developing economies with a significant exchange rate pass-through.
23 Haussman uses nominal rather than real interest ates so that, even in theabsence of a tightening, a
positive correlation may be r flecting devaluation expectations.
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classification both countries are labeled as floaters, which is consistent with the fact that
they are both using monetary policy independently in order to affect the behavior of the
nominal exchange rate. Should Mexico be classified as a dirty float? One is tempted to
think that the negative consequences of an abrupt depreciation (of which inflation is
only one) was in the mind of the Mexican authorities while deciding their interest rate
policy. However, we should note that Canada, a country that, like Mexico, has an
inflation target, displayed the same positive correlation at the time.24 25
4. Final Remarks
Having a proper exchange rate regime classification is essential for a proper
understanding of the implications of choosing different exchange rate regimes. This
paper generates what we believe is a more meaningful classification of exchange rate
regimes than that so far used in empirical work, and is a necessary first step for research
in the area.
The main contribution of the paper is to present, for the first time, an exchange rate
regime classification entirely based on facts rather than on legal characteristic of the
regime. Moreover, our approach highlights the importance of distinguishing between
low and high variability countries to better analyze the link between regimes and other
macroeconomic variables. Although some basic characteristics already emerged from
simple inspection of the classification, only future empirical research will reveal
whether this new classification proves useful to understand the implications of different
exchange rate regimes. Future work should also explore the possibility of using a
similar approach to build from the data a quantitative indicator of the relative fixedness
of exchange rate regimes.
                                   
24 Canada is also a float according to our index.
25 We do not intend to close the discussion here. Rather, we prefer to suggest that an alternative
classification could be conceived that assigns regimes according to the (non-observable) targets of the
monetary authorities. There, both Canada and (particularly) Mexico would be deemed managed floats, as
will be any country that keep exchange rate in check to limit inflationary pressures. However, the
previous discussion indicates the non trivial problems involved in defining classification variables that
accurately capture the latent objective function of the central bank.
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Appendix 1: Currencies of Reference
The currency of references for each country were the following:
Albania, US dollar. Antigua and Barbuda, US dollar, Argentina, US dollar, Australia,
US dollar. Austria, German marc. B ha s, US dollar. Bahrain, US dollar. Barbados,
US dollar. Belgium, German marc. Belize, US dollar. Benin, French franc. B utan,
Indian rupee. Bolivia, US dollar. Brazi , US dollar. Burkina Faso, French franc.
Cameroon, French franc. Canada, US dollar. Centr l African Republic, French franc.
Chad, French franc. Chile: central band parity as published by the Central Bank of Chile
(non IFS data). Colombia, US dollar. Comoros, French franc. Democratic Republic of
Congo, French franc. Republic of Congo (previously Zaire), US dollar. Costa Rica, US
dollar. Cote d’Ivoire, French franc. Denmark, German mark. Djibouti, US dollar.
Dominica, US dollar. Dominican Republic, US dollar. Ecuador, US dollar. Egypt, US
dollar. El Salvador, US dollar. Equatorial Guinea, French franc. Ethiopia, US dollar.
Finland, German marc. France, German marc. Gabon, French franc. The Gambia,
British pound. Germany, US dollar. Ghana, US dollar. Greece, German marc. Gren da,
US dollar. Guatemala, US dollar. Guinea-Bissau, French franc. Guyana, US dollar.
Haiti, US dollar. Honduras, US dollar. Hong-Kong, US dollar. India, US dollar.
Indonesia, US dollar. Ireland, German marc. Israel, US dollar. Italy, German marc.
Jamaica US dollar. Japan, US dollar. Kenya, US dollar. K re , US dollar. Kuwait, US
dollar (it is strictly an undisclosed peg where the dollar carries most of the weight).
Lebanon, US dollar. Lesotho, South African rand. Libya, IMF Deg, Luxembourg,
German marc. Madagascar, US dollar. Malaysia, US dollar. Maldives, US dollar. Mali,
French franc. Mauritius, French franc. Mexico, US dollar. Mongolia, US dollar.
Myanmar, US dollar. Namibia, South African rand. Nepal, Indian rupee. Netherlands,
German marc. Netherlands Antilles, US dollar. N w Zealand, US dollar. Niger, F ench
franc. Nigeria, US dollar. Norway, German marc. Oman, US dollar. Papua New Guinea,
US dollar. P aguay, US dollar. Peru, US dollar. Phi ippines, US dollar. Poland,
German marc. Portugal, German marc. Q tar, US dollar. Rwand , IMF deg. Saudi
Arabia, US dollar. Seneg l, French franc. Sierra Leone, US dollar. Slovenia, German
marc. South Africa, US dollar. Spain, Ge man marc. St. Kitts and Nevis, US dollar. St.
Lucia, US dollar. St. Vincent & Grenadines, US dollar. Swaziland, South African rand.
Sweden, German marc. Switzerland, US dollar. Tanzania, US dollar. Thai and, US
dollar. Togo, US dollar. Trinidad & Tobago, US dollar. Turkey, US dollar. United Arab
Emirates, US dollar. United Kingdom, German marc. United States, German marc.
Uruguay, US dollar. Venezuela, US dollar. Repub ic of Yemen, US dollar. Zambia, US
dollar. Zimbabwe, US dollar.
Other countries were eliminated because of lack of data or because their currency basket
to which they pegged was unknown. Panama was eliminated because there was no
information on its money base.
Appendix 2: Exchange Rate Regime per country per year
The data is presented in table A2.
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Appendix 3: IFS vs. K-means classification
The tables A3.1 through A3.9 correspond to the comparison with the IMF classification
and are presented in order per year.
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1st Round Boundaries
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Float 1.1% 4.9% 0.2% 6.9% 0.1% 13.0%
Dirty 7.4% 12.0% 16.1% 28.9% 1.5% 18.5%
Dirty/CP 3.5% 9.8% 0.9% 15.1% 2.2% 28.6%
Fixed 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 8.3% 12.4% 41.8%
2nd Round Boundaries
Float 0.5% 1.4% 0.1% 1.9% 0.1% 5.4%
Dirty 0.6% 1.3% 0.6% 1.7% 4.8% 12.0%
Dirty/CP 0.3% 1.2% 0.1% 1.0% 4.3% 12.4%
Float 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 5.7% 12.7%
Average monthly
volatility in the 
exchange rate
Table 2: Cluster boundaries
monetary base)
Average monthly
volatility in the change





1st Round Classification (without outliers)
Total number of cases=933







Total number of cases=547







Total number of cases=955






Table 3: Exchange Rate Classification, whole sample
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Irrelevant Float Dirty Dirty/CP Fix Total
Number of cases
1990 25 27 6 17 22 97
1991 28 26 2 18 25 99
1992 23 29 5 14 33 104
1993 25 33 8 9 31 106
1994 21 24 24 11 26 106
1995 22 38 10 10 31 111
1996 24 32 5 15 35 111
1997 26 30 4 16 35 111
1998 27 34 5 14 30 110
Total 221 273 69 124 268 955
% Participation      
1990 26% 28% 6% 18% 23% 100%
1991 28% 26% 2% 18% 25% 100%
1992 22% 28% 5% 13% 32% 100%
1993 24% 31% 8% 8% 29% 100%
1994 20% 23% 23% 10% 25% 100%
1995 20% 34% 9% 9% 28% 100%
1996 22% 29% 5% 14% 32% 100%
1997 23% 27% 4% 14% 32% 100%
1998 25% 31% 5% 13% 27% 100%
Table 4a: Exchange Rate Regimes per year
All cases
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Irrelevant Float Dirty Dirty/CP Fix Total
Number of cases
1990 25 8 3 9 12 57
1991 28 4 1 9 10 52
1992 23 5 4 8 15 55
1993 25 7 7 6 16 61
1994 21 6 7 9 8 51
1995 22 11 9 6 20 68
1996 24 8 5 11 20 68
1997 26 10 4 9 20 69
1998 27 10 5 7 17 66
Total 221 69 45 74 138 547
% Participation      
1990 44% 14% 5% 16% 21% 100%
1991 54% 8% 2% 17% 19% 100%
1992 42% 9% 7% 15% 27% 100%
1993 41% 11% 11% 10% 26% 100%
1994 41% 12% 14% 18% 16% 100%
1995 32% 16% 13% 9% 29% 100%
1996 35% 12% 7% 16% 29% 100%
1997 38% 14% 6% 13% 29% 100%
1998 41% 15% 8% 11% 26% 100%
Table 4b: Exchange Rate Regimes per year
Only Irrelevants
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Number of Fixers which Floaters whichTotal number"Deeds are not
coincidences do not fix do not float of cases your words"
1990 25 11 9 66 30%
1991 25 9 13 69 32%
1992 33 8 11 72 26%
1993 34 4 13 76 22%
1994 23 17 16 77 43%
1995 40 8 16 87 28%
1996 40 4 13 84 20%
1997 41 3 11 81 17%
1998 38 3 12 76 20%
Source: tables A3.1-A3.9. Inconclusives have not been considered in this table.
Table 5: IFS vs. K-means
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Developed Economies
ALEMANIA Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float
AUSTRALIA Float Float Float Float Float Float Float(2) Float Float
ESTADOS UNIDOS Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float
JAPÓN Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float
CANADÁ Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float
European EMS-EMU countries
FRANCIA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Fixed Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Irrelevant Irrelevant
ESPAÑA Float(2) Float(2) Float Float Fixed Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Fixed(2)
IRLANDA Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Float Fixed Fixed Fixed
ITALIA Float(2) Irrelevant Float Float Float Float Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)
DINAMARCA Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed(2)
AUSTRIA Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
Emerging Economies
ARGENTINA Dirty(3) Dirty/CP Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
BRASIL Dirty(3) Dirty(3) Fixed(3) Fixed(3) Fixed(3) Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)
COREA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Dirty/CP Dirty/CP
CHILE Float(2) Irrelevant Float Float Float Float Float(2) Float(2) Float(2)
INDONESIA Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Fixed Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP Dirty(3)
MALASIA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Float Float(2) Float(2) Float Dirty/CP
MÉXICO Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Dirty/CP Dirty(2) Float Float
TAILANDIA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty/CP(2)Irrelevant Dirty/CP Dirty/CP
Small Open Economies
BAHAMAS, LAS Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
CÔTE D'IVOIRE Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
GAMBIA Fixed Fixed Fixed Float Fixed Dirty(2) Float Fixed Dirty(2)
LESOTHO Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
NÍGER Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed
SANTA LUCÍA Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
Table 6: Exchange Rate Regimes for Selected Countries
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Figure 1.



































































Figure 4: Exchange Rate Classification
Main data (933)






Eliminate outliers:  
Upper 1% tail on all dimensions
Total number of
observations = 955
Compute se,sDe, sIR  - country / - ear
Irrelevants
Re-normalize
K means with 5 clusters
(2nd round)
Outliers (22)




observations= 547 = 386
Number of
observations
Choose currency of reference
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Figure 5. 1st Round Classification
Custer 1 Custer 2











































Figure 6. 2nd Round Classification
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Cluster 3 Cluster 4










































1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ALBANIA Float Float Dirty/CP Float
ALEMANIA Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float
ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant
ARABIA SAUDITA Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
ARGENTINA Dirty(3) Dirty/CP Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
AUSTRALIA Float Float Float Float Float Float Float(2) Float Float
AUSTRIA Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
BAHAMAS, LAS Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
BAHREIN Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant
BARBADOS Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
BÉLGICA Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
BELICE Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2)
BENIN Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
BHUTÁN Dirty/CP(2)Float Fixed(2) Float Dirty Dirty(2) Float Dirty(2) Dirty(2)
BOLIVIA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant
BRASIL Dirty(3) Dirty(3) Fixed(3) Fixed(3) Fixed(3) Float Dirty/CP(2) Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)
BURKINA FASO Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
CAMERÚN Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant
CANADÁ Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float
CHAD Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant
CHILE Float(2) Irrelevant Float Float Float Float Float(2) Float(2) Float(2)
COLOMBIA Float Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Float Float Float Float Float
COMORAS Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant
CONGO, REP. DEL Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant
CONGO, REP. DEM. DEL Dirty(3) Dirty(3) Dirty(3) Fixed(3) Fixed(3)
COREA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Dirty/CP Dirty/CP
COSTA RICA Float Float Float Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Dirty/CP(2) Dirty/CP(2)Float(2)
CÔTE D'IVOIRE Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
DINAMARCA Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed(2)
DJIBOUTI Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
DOMINICA Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
ECUADOR Float Float Dirty/CP Dirty(2) Dirty(2) Float Float Float Dirty/CP
EGIPTO Dirty Dirty/CP Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
EL SALVADOR Dirty/CP Irrelevant Dirty(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
EMIRATOS ÁRABES UNIDOS Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant
ESLOVENIA Dirty/CP Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Fixed Fixed Dirty/CP(2)
ESPAÑA Float(2) Float(2) Float Float Fixed Float Dirty/CP(2) Dirty/CP(2)Fixed(2)
ESTADOS UNIDOS Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float
ETIOPÍA Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty(3) Irrelevant Float Float(2) Irrelevant Float(2) Dirty(2)
FILIPINAS Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Fixed Dirty(2) Float(2) Fixed(2) Float Dirty/CP
FINLANDIA Fixed Fixed Fixed Dirty(2) Fixed Fixed Fixed
FRANCIA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Fixed Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant
GABÓN Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Dirty Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed(2)
GAMBIA Fixed Fixed Fixed Float Fixed Dirty(2) Float Fixed Dirty(2)
GHANA Dirty(2) Fixed Float Float Float Fixed Float Float
GRANADA Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
GRECIA Float(2) Dirty/CP(2)Float(2) Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Float
GUATEMALA Dirty/CP Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float Float Dirty(2)
GUINEA ECUATORIAL Fixed(2) Fixed(3) Fixed Fixed Dirty Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed
GUINEA-BISSAU Fixed Dirty/CP Dirty/CP Float Float Float Float Fixed
GUYANA Float Dirty Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Fixed(2) Irrelevant Float
HAITÍ Irrelevant Float Float Float Float
HONDURAS Dirty Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Float Float Float Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)
HONG KONG, RAE DE Fixed(2) Fixed
INDIA Float(2) Float Irrelevant Float Irrelevant Float Float Float(2) Float(2)
INDONESIA Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Fixed Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty/CP(2) Dirty/CP Dirty(3)
IRLANDA Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Float Fixed Fixed Fixed
ISRAEL Float Float Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Float Dirty(2) Float
ITALIA Float(2) Irrelevant Float Float Float Float Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)
JAMAICA Float Dirty/CP Float Float Float(2) Float Float Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)
JAPÓN Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float
KENYA Dirty/CP Dirty/CP Float Fixed Float Float
KUWAIT Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Dirty(2) Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed
LESOTHO Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
LÍBANO Fixed(3) Fixed Fixed(3) Fixed(3) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
LIBIA Irrelevant Irrelevant Float(2) Float(2) Float Float(2) Dirty/CP(2) Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)
LUXEMBURGO Irrelevant Dirty(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2)
MADAGASCAR Dirty(2) Float Float Dirty(2) Dirty Float Float Float Float
MALASIA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Float Float(2) Float(2) Float Dirty/CP
MALDIVAS Float(2) Float Float Float(2) Float(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
MALÍ Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
Table A2: Exchange Rate Regime per country per year
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
MAURICIO Float(2) Dirty/CP(2) Float(2) Float(2)
MÉXICO Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Fixed Dirty/CP Dirty(2) Float Float
MONGOLIA Dirty(3) Fixed Dirty(2) Dirty/CP Float Dirty(2)
MYANMAR Float Float Float Float(2) Float Float Float(2) Float(2) Float(2)
NAMIBIA Fixed Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
NEPAL Float(2) Float Irrelevant Float Irrelevant Float(2) Float(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant
NÍGER Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed
NIGERIA Fixed Dirty/CP Dirty Float Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
NORUEGA Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
NUEVA ZELANDIA Float Float Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Float
OMÁN Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
PAÍSES BAJOS Irrelevant Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Fixed(2) Dirty/CP(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant
PAPUA NUEVA GUINEA Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
PARAGUAY Float Dirty(2) Float Float(2) Dirty/CP(2) Irrelevant Dirty/CP(2) Dirty(2) Float
PERÚ Dirty(3) Dirty/CP Dirty/CP Float Dirty(2) Float(2) Float(2) Dirty/CP(2)Float(2)
POLONIA Float Float Float Float Float Float Dirty(2) Float Float
PORTUGAL Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
QATAR Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
REINO UNIDO Float Float(2) Float Float Float(2) Float Float Float Float
REPÚBLICA CENTROAFRICANAIrrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA Dirty/CP Float Float(2) Irrelevant Dirty(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2) Float(2)
RWANDA Dirty/CP Fixed(2) Float Irrelevant Dirty Irrelevant Float Float
SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2) Irrelevant Fixed(2)
SAN VICENTE Y LAS GRANADINASFixed(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
SANTA LUCÍA Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
SENEGAL Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
SIERRA LEONA Dirty/CP Dirty/CP Float Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP Float Dirty/CP Float
SUDÁFRICA Dirty(2) Float Float Dirty(2) Dirty(2) Dirty/CP(2)Float Float Float
SUECIA Float Dirty/CP Fixed Fixed Float Float Float Dirty(2) Float
SUIZA Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float Float
SWAZILANDIA Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed(2) Fixed Fixed Fixed
TAILANDIA Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty/CP(2)Irrelevant Dirty/CP Dirty/CP
TANZANÍA Fixed(3) Float Dirty(2) Float Float Float(2) Float(2)
TOGO Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Fixed(2) Dirty Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2)
TRINIDAD Y TABAGO Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Fixed(2) Dirty/CP Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2)Dirty/CP(2) Irrelevant Irrelevant
TURQUÍA Float Float Float Float Dirty Float Dirty/CP Dirty/CP Fixed
URUGUAY Dirty/CP Float Float Float Float Float Float Float(2) Float(2)
VENEZUELA Float Float Float Float Dirty/CP Dirty/CP Dirty/CP Fixed Float
YEMEN, REPÚBLICA DEL Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Dirty(3) Dirty(3) Float(2) Float(2)
ZAMBIA Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
ZIMBABWE Fixed Fixed Fixed Dirty/CP Dirty/CP
Table A2: Exchange Rate Regime per country per year
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1990 Fix Bands Dirty Float
Inconclusive ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA EMIRATOS ÁRABES UNIDOS





















Floats GUYANA ESPAÑA (2) COLOMBIA ALEMANIA
MYANMAR ITALIA (2) COSTA RICA AUSTRALIA
NEPAL (2) CHILE (2) CANADÁ (2)
POLONIA ECUADOR ESTADOS UNIDOS







Dirties EGIPTO ARGENTINA (3)
ZIMBABWE MADAGASCAR (2) GHANA (2)
SUDÁFRICA
Dirties/CP BHUTÁN (2) DINAMARCA (2) COREA (2) BOLIVIA (2)
FINLANDIA FRANCIA (2) INDONESIA (2) GUATEMALA 
MALASIA (2) MÉXICO (2) URUGUAY
RWANDA
TAILANDIA (2)
Fixes BAHAMAS, LAS (2) ARABIA SAUDITA (2) GUINEA-BISSAU GAMBIA
CHAD (2) BAHREIN PORTUGAL LÍBANO (3)









SAN VICENTE Y LAS GRANADINAS (2)
SWAZILANDIA


























1991 Fix Bands Dirty Float
















SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS





Floats BHUTÁN ESPAÑA (2) COLOMBIA ALEMANIA
KENYA REINO UNIDO (2) COSTA RICA AUSTRALIA
MARRUECOS ECUADOR CANADÁ (2)
MYANMAR INDIA ESTADOS UNIDOS











Dirties/CP ARGENTINA FRANCIA (2) COREA (2) BOLIVIA (2)
MALASIA (2) PAÍSES BAJOS (2) EGIPTO FILIPINAS (2)
SUECIA GRECIA (2) JAMAICA 
TAILANDIA (2) GUINEA-BISSAU NIGERIA
HONDURAS (2) PERÚ
SIERRA LEONA
Fixes ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS (2) ARABIA SAUDITA INDONESIA GAMBIA
BAHAMAS, LAS (2) BAHREIN (2) MÉXICO GHANA
BELICE (2) DINAMARCA PORTUGAL LÍBANO



































1992 Fix Bands Dirty Float



















Floats ESPAÑA CHILE ALEMANIA
LIBIA (2) GRECIA (2) AUSTRALIA
MYANMAR ISRAEL CANADÁ (2)












Dirties CONGO, REP. DEM. DEL (3) EL SALVADOR (2)
ETIOPÍA (3) FILIPINAS (2)
MALASIA (2) HONDURAS (2)
NIGERIA
Dirties/CP TAILANDIA (2) FRANCIA (2) COLOMBIA (2) BOLIVIA (2)




Fixes ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA (2) ARABIA SAUDITA (2) INDONESIA BRASIL (3)
ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS (2) BAHREIN GAMBIA
ARGENTINA (2) DINAMARCA LÍBANO (3)











SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS (2)
SWAZILANDIA
TANZANÍA (3)


























1993 Fix Bands Dirty Float




















Floats BHUTÁN ESPAÑA CHILE ALEMANIA
LIBIA (2) ESLOVENIA AUSTRALIA
MYANMAR (2) GUINEA-BISSAU CANADÁ (2)
ISRAEL COSTA RICA (2)














Dirties CONGO, REP. DEM. DEL (3) BÉLGICA (2) ECUADOR (2) GRECIA (2)
LUXEMBURGO (2) MADAGASCAR (2) SIERRA LEONA (2)
SUDÁFRICA (2)
Dirties/CP PAÍSES BAJOS (2) COLOMBIA (2) GUYANA (2)
COREA (2) TRINIDAD Y TOBAGO
MÉXICO (2)
Fixes ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS (2) ARABIA SAUDITA (2) INDONESIA (2) BOLIVIA
ARGENTINA (2) BAHREIN (2) BRASIL (3)
BAHAMAS, LAS (2) DINAMARCA FILIPINAS
BARBADOS (2) EMIRATOS ÁRABES UNIDOS (2) FINLANDIA
BELICE (2) FRANCIA LÍBANO (3)
DOMINICA (2) IRLANDA NORUEGA



































1994 Fix Bands Dirty Float
Inconclusive ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA BÉLGICA EGIPTO EL SALVADOR











Floats LIBIA COLOMBIA ALEMANIA
MYANMAR CHILE AUSTRALIA
GUINEA-BISSAU CANADÁ (2)
MALASIA COSTA RICA (2)










Dirties BENIN ECUADOR (2) FILIPINAS (2)
BHUTÁN TURQUÍA GUYANA (2)













Dirties/CP PAÍSES BAJOS (2) COREA (2) BOLIVIA (2)
ESLOVENIA (2) KENYA
GRECIA (2) PARAGUAY (2)
ISRAEL (2) SIERRA LEONA (2)
TRINIDAD Y TOBAGO (2)
Fixes ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS (2) ARABIA SAUDITA (2) FINLANDIA
BAHAMAS, LAS (2) BAHREIN GAMBIA
BARBADOS (2) DINAMARCA LÍBANO (2)
KUWAIT ESPAÑA MONGOLIA
LESOTHO FRANCIA NORUEGA
NAMIBIA (2) IRLANDA NUEVA ZELANDIA
OMÁN PORTUGAL



























1995 Fix Bands Dirty Float
Inconclusive ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA AUSTRIA EGIPTO PARAGUAY
BURKINA FASO BÉLGICA INDONESIA
CAMERÚN EMIRATOS ÁRABES UNIDOS MALDIVAS






SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS
SAN VICENTE Y LAS GRANADINAS
SANTA LUCÍA
Floats LIBIA (2) ESPAÑA BRASIL ALBANIA
MYANMAR IRLANDA CHILE ALEMANIA




MALASIA (2) FILIPINAS (2)
MAURICIO (2) GUATEMALA (2)
POLONIA HAITÍ











Dirties BHUTÁN (2) FRANCIA (2) ESLOVENIA (2) FINLANDIA (2)
KUWAIT (2) GRECIA (2) GAMBIA (2)
YEMEN, REPÚBLICA DEL (3) ISRAEL (2) MONGOLIA (2)
RWANDA





TRINIDAD Y TOBAGO (2)
Fixes ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS (2) BAHREIN (2) GHANA
ARGENTINA (2) DINAMARCA LÍBANO (2)
BAHAMAS, LAS (2) PAÍSES BAJOS (2) NUEVA ZELANDIA










































1996 Fix Bands Dirty Float
Inconclusive ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA AUSTRIA EGIPTO ETIOPÍA
ARGENTINA BÉLGICA EL SALVADOR LÍBANO












Floats BHUTÁN COLOMBIA ALBANIA
MYANMAR (2) CHILE (2) ALEMANIA


















Dirties COREA (2) MÉXICO (2)
GRECIA (2) YEMEN, REPÚBLICA DEL (3)
POLONIA (2)
Dirties/CP LIBIA (2) ESPAÑA (2) BRASIL (2) BOLIVIA (2)
FRANCIA (2) COSTA RICA (2) MONGOLIA
PAÍSES BAJOS (2) INDONESIA (2) PARAGUAY (2)
MAURICIO (2) TRINIDAD Y TOBAGO (2)
TURQUÍA
Fixes ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS (2) BAHREIN (2) ESLOVENIA FILIPINAS (2)
BAHAMAS, LAS (2) DINAMARCA NORUEGA GUYANA (2)
BELICE (2) IRLANDA KENYA
BENIN (2) PORTUGAL NUEVA ZELANDIA
CHAD (2) QATAR (2) PAPUA NUEVA GUINEA
COMORAS (2) ZAMBIA









SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS (2)





























1997 Fix Bands Dirty Float
Inconclusive ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA AUSTRIA EGIPTO BOLIVIA
ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS BÉLGICA EL SALVADOR GUYANA
ARGENTINA FRANCIA MALDIVAS LÍBANO
BELICE LUXEMBURGO TRINIDAD Y TABAGO








SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS
SANTA LUCÍA




MAURICIO (2) ETIOPÍA (2)
POLONIA FILIPINAS














YEMEN, REPÚBLICA DEL (2)
Dirties BHUTÁN (2) ISRAEL (2) PARAGUAY (2)
SUECIA (2)
Dirties/CP LIBIA (2) ESPAÑA (2) BRASIL (2) ALBANIA
ITALIA (2) COSTA RICA (2) JAMAICA (2)
GRECIA (2) PERÚ (2)
HONDURAS (2) SIERRA LEONA
TURQUÍA ZIMBABWE
Fixes BAHAMAS, LAS (2) BAHREIN (2) ESLOVENIA GAMBIA
BARBADOS (2) DINAMARCA NORUEGA NUEVA ZELANDIA
BENIN (2) EMIRATOS ÁRABES UNIDOS (2) VENEZUELA PAPUA NUEVA GUINEA
CAMERÚN (2) FINLANDIA ZAMBIA
CHAD (2) IRLANDA
CONGO, REP. DEL (2) PORTUGAL
CÔTE D'IVOIRE (2) QATAR (2)
GABÓN
GUINEA ECUATORIAL (2)




































1998 Fix Bands Dirty Float
Inconclusive ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA AUSTRIA EGIPTO LÍBANO
ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS BAHREIN EL SALVADOR TRINIDAD Y TOBAGO
ARGENTINA BÉLGICA MALDIVAS












Floats MYANMAR (2) COLOMBIA ALBANIA
COSTA RICA (2) ALEMANIA
CHILE (2) AUSTRALIA
ISRAEL CANADÁ
MAURICIO (2) ESTADOS UNIDOS
POLONIA GUYANA
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA (2) HAITÍ













YEMEN, REPÚBLICA DEL (2)




Dirties/CP LIBIA (2) ITALIA (2) BRASIL (2) COREA
ECUADOR FILIPINAS
ESLOVENIA (2) GHANA (2)
HONDURAS (2) JAMAICA (2)
ZIMBABWE
Fixes BAHAMAS, LAS (2) DINAMARCA (2) NORUEGA GUINEA ECUATORIAL
BARBADOS (2) ESPAÑA (2) TURQUÍA PAPUA NUEVA GUINEA
BELICE (2) FINLANDIA ZAMBIA
BENIN (2) IRLANDA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE (2) LUXEMBURGO (2)
GABÓN (2) PORTUGAL






SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS (2)





























K means Classification IFS Classification
1990 JAMAICA Floats Fix / Float
REINO UNIDO Floats Float / Bands
PERÚ Dirties Fix / Float
HONDURAS Dirties Fix / Dirty
BRASIL Dirties Dirty / float
EL SALVADOR Dirties/CP Dirty / Float
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA Dirties/CP Dirty / Fix
SIERRA LEONA Dirties/CP Fix / Float
1991 ISRAEL Floats Fix / Dirty
MALDIVAS Floats Float / Dirty
POLONIA Floats Fix / Dirty
1992 ITALIA Floats Bands / Float
REINO UNIDO Floats Bands / Float
URUGUAY Floats Float / Dirty
FINLANDIA Fixes Fix / Float
NAMIBIA Fixes Float / Fix
NORUEGA Fixes Fix / Float
PORTUGAL Fixes Dirty / Bands
SUECIA Fixes Fix / Float
1993 ETIOPÍA Inconclusive Fix / Float
TANZANIA Floats Fix / Float
VENEZUELA Floats Float / Dirty
NEPAL Floats Float / Fix
MONGOLIA Dirties Fix / Float
KENYA Dirties/CP Fix / Float
MALASIA Dirties/CP Fix / Dirty
1994 AUSTRIA Inconclusive Fix / Band
HONDURAS Floats Float / Dirty
MADAGASCAR Dirties Dirty / Float
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA Dirties Float / Dirty
VENEZUELA Dirties/CP Dirty / Fix
BRASIL Fixes Float / Dirty
PAPUA NUEVA GUINEA Fixes Fix / Float
ZIMBABWE Fixes Fix / Float
1995 EL SALVADOR Inconclusive Float / Dirty
COSTA RICA Floats Float / Dirty
NORUEGA Fixes Float / Dirty
1996 ITALIA Dirties Float / Bands
VENEZUELA Dirties/CP Fix / Dirty
FINLANDIA Fixes Float / Bands
1997 COREA Dirties/CP Dirty / Float
INDONESIA Dirties/CP Dirty / Float
TAILANDIA Dirties/CP Fix / Dirty
GUINEA- BISSAU Fixes Dirty / Fix
1998 BOLIVIA Inconclusive Float / Dirty
GRECIA Floats Dirty / Bands
KENYA Floats Float / Dirty
PARAGUAY Floats Float / Dirty
ETIOPÍA Dirties Float / Dirty
MALASIA Dirties/CP Dirty / Fix
TAILANDIA Dirties/CP Dirty / Float
NIGERIA Fixes Fix / Dirty
Table A3.10
